PART 1 –– COMING TO THE RESCUE?
One of the keys to life is water. We cook with it; we bathe with it; we wash things with it; we drink it. If the water is dirty, we might try to filter and clean the water to be able to use it. If the water is contaminated, we would not do any of those things with it.
Saving money is a good thing; families and individuals try to budget their money to make ends meet. Businesses and governmental entities try to save money as well. Sometimes, the cost-cutting measures are effective means of budgetary restraint. Sometimes, they come at a serious cost, either to product quality ... or human life itself.
It is in Flint, Michigan, where saving money and a threat to human life have intersected.
Beginning in December of 2011, a string of Governor-appointed Emergency Managers (EM) were put in charge of Flint due to the city's financial crisis. All of the EMs reported to Michigan Governor Rick Snyder. They had no requirements, as EMs, to go through or to inform the mayor or townspeople of their decisions ahead of time. No discussions, no engagement. The people of Flint had no say in decisions made and actions taken by its Emergency Managers. The first EM was Michael Brown.
Near the end of 2013, officials from Michigan's Treasury Department meet with officials from Flint to discuss water supply options to cut costs -- stay with what they had or change to the Karegnondi Water Authority. Using the Flint River was discussed at that meeting, but staying the course or changing to the Karegnondi Water Authority were to be the only two options to be researched. A report of the meeting was released two months later. One month after the report was released, Flint's city council votes in favor of switching to Karegnondi. It will require a pipeline project that will take two-and-a-half years to complete.
Flint used to get its water from the Detroit water system. In the mid-1960s, Detroit entered into a contract with Flint to supply its water. The agreement could be legally terminated, if so chosen, only after the passing of thirty-five years; the thirty-five years had elapsed in 2010. In the Spring of 2013, three years past the mandatory thirty-five year period, even though it wanted to keep the agreement in effect, the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) chose to end the contract, giving Flint one-year's notice. Michigan officials spun it in a way to make it look like Detroit had abandoned Flint when, in fact, the DWSD's decision was in response to the Emergency Manager making his own decision on water suppliers.
Under their second Emergency Manager at that time, Ed Kurtz, the city council's vote to go with Karegnondi held no weight. Nonetheless, Kurtz did sign off on going with Karegnondi. It then turns out that the pipeline project will not be done in a year's time, leaving Flint to negotiate a new contract with its current supplier, the Detroit Water and Sewage Department, or to find a temporary supplier in the interim.
Just over two months later, in June of 2013, Ed Kurtz, apparently in an attempt to find a temporary water source, hires an engineering company, Lockwood, Andrews & Newman to equip the already-existing Flint River water treatment plant. Four days later, Ed Kurtz stepped down as EM, a move he had announced a month earlier. Michael Brown, the first EM in this situation, returns as EM. Just two months later, Brown resigns, citing family issues as his reason.
Three weeks later, Darnell Earley, who had served as interim Mayor for Flint in 2002, becomes its next Emergency Manager. Fast forward to the Spring of 2014. Roughly a month before the one-year notice given by Detroit to end supplying water to Flint had expired, Earley writes the Detroit Water and Sewage Department, stating that there will be no need to enter into a new contract, as the Flint River water treatment plant will be fully operational before the almost-expired contract ends.
It might be good to stop for just a moment to ask, with everything going on, why not just stay hooked up with Detroit until the new pipeline is in place and operational? Maybe the answer lies in the fact that the city of Detroit is also under the authority of a Governor-appointed Emergency Manager.
In early April, Michigan's environmental regulators approved the move to using Flint River water, and by late April, the city's water supply was now coming exclusively from the Flint River.
Within weeks, residents complained about the water quality ... its discoloration and smell, as well as making residents sick.
Now that's funny: The water at the first day from Flint River looks different than weeks later...
Two-and-a-half months after the Flint River became the town's sole water source, its water tested positive for E. coli, with the town issuing several boil-your-water-before-using advisories. Chlorine is added to combat the bacteria. By the Fall, a General Motors engine plant stops using Flint River water, citing the additional chlorine would cause corrosion to engine parts.
Over the course of two weeks, beginning on January 2, 2015 ...
Flint is found to be in violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act by the state's Department of Environmental Quality (from the presence of cancer-causing total trihalomenthanes (TTHM) resulting from the treatment of the water);
Flint Mayor Dayne Walling says the water is safe to drink;
The University of Michigan-Flint found some water samples from on campus to be high in lead;
Emergency Manager Darnell Earley says Flint will not go back to getting water from Detroit;
and then, EM Earley is reappointed to be Emergency Manager of the Detroit Public School System.
Earley is replaced by Jerry Ambrose, who had served Flint as a financial advisor under the first and second Emergency Managers, Michael Brown and Ed Kurtz. (Remember those guys?)
In late February, Flint tested the water of resident Lee Anne Walters, a mother of four, and the results showed the water in her house contained 104 parts per billion (ppb) of lead. The Environmental Protection Agency's safe limit of lead in water is fifteen ppb; Walters' water was seven times the safe limit. The test of her home's water would be only the first of several to be conducted by the city of Flint. The following week, her water was tested again –– this time the lead level had risen from 104 ppb to 397 ppb, nearly 183 times the safe level,
A bottle of Walters' tap water
All of the then-current results from Flint prompt the Environmental Protection Agency to inquire about the city's efforts to combat the situation. Steve Busch, who was a district supervisor from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, sends an E-mail to the EPA stating that they are executing what he described as an "optimized corrosion control plan", which included pumping phosphates and other chemicals to essentially coat over the internal pipes corrosion.
The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality was, in fact, doing nothing.
On March 23, 2015, the Flint City Council votes 7-1 in favor of making any and all possible efforts to reconnect with Detroit for water. Keep in mind, though, under the appointed Emergency Manager, this vote carries no authority. The children of Lee Anne Walters, whose water was the first tested in Flint, had experienced stomach issues, some hair loss, and rashes since the previous year. The month following the Flint City Council's vote, Walters learned that one of her young sons, age 4, had lead poisoning. The city discovers that the lead is in Walter's house's service line that is connected to the city's water system.
The city's (EM's) solution? Shut off Walters' service line and hook her house up to a neighbor's garden hose.
Terry
TOMORROW
ONLY ONE CRISIS ENDS
ONLY ONE CRISIS ENDS
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